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In this paper a simple dynamic optimization problem is solved with the help of
the recursive saddle point method developed by Marcet and Marimon (1999). Ac-
cording to Marcet and Marimon, their technique should yield a full characterization
of the set of solutions for this problem. We show though, that while their method
allows us to calculate the true value of the optimization program, not all solutions
which it admits are correct. Indeed, some of the policies which it generates as
solutions to our problem, are either suboptimal or do not even satisfy feasibility.
We identify the reasons underlying this failure and discuss its implications for the
numerous existing applications.
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Marcet and Marimon (1999) (henceforth MM) develop an elegant and ﬂexible recursive
saddle point method, suitable for solving a wide class of dynamic optimization problems.
Because of its tractability and computational advantages, throughout the last years
many authors have started applying this approach.1 The list of papers in which it is
used includes, among many others, Attanasio and Rios-Rull(2001), Ayagari, Marcet,
Sargent and Sepp¨ al¨ a (2002), Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2001), Friedman (1998),
Kehoe and Perri (2002), Khan, King and Wolman (2000), Klein and Rios-Rull (2002),
Marcet and Marimon (1992), Sepp¨ al¨ a (2002), and Siu (2002).
In this paper we apply the MM method to a simple concave dynamic optimization
problem which falls into the class of problems which MM consider in their paper. In
this example a principal has to share a constant stream of endowments with an agent in
such a way that his own utility is maximized subject to the constraint that the agent’s
utility never falls below a certain threshold. We show that while the MM technique
allows one to calculate the true value of the problem, the set of solutions which it admits
does not coincide with the true set of solutions. In particular, in our example the MM
approach allows both for solutions which are feasible but suboptimal and solutions
which even violate feasibility.
The method developed by MM builds on the fact that the solution of an opti-
mization problem can often be obtained by ﬁnding the saddle points of its associated
Lagrangean. Roughly speaking, the idea underlying the MM approach is to use recur-
sive techniques to calculate these saddle points. That is, MM aim to show that by using
appropriate summaries of the Lagrange multipliers as state variables (MM refer to these
state variables as co-states) a sequential saddle point problem can be transformed into
a recursive one which gives rise to exactly the same set of solutions.2 In particular,
they argue that the equivalence between sequential and recursive saddle points does
not require any concavity assumptions on the underlying optimization problem. They
conclude therefore that, just as the standard Lagrangean approach, their method pro-
vides a full characterization of the set of solutions of concave optimization programs,
and yields suﬃcient conditions for solutions of nonconcave problems.3
1 One of the key advantages of the MM method with respect to dynamic programming is that
the state space is not itself endogenous but is given exogenously. This can simplify the numerical the
numerical analysis substantially as costly preliminary computations which the Bellman approach might
imply can be avoided (see, for example, Abraham and Pavoni (2003) and Chang (1998)).
2Hence, they essentially extend Bellman’s Principle of Optimality for dynamic optimization problems
to (a class of) dynamic saddle point problems.
3In their own words: ’Concavity is no more necessary for our approach than for the classical La-
grangean method.’ (MM page 3).
1Since our example is concave, equivalence between saddle points of the Lagrangean
and solutions of the optimization problem indeed holds. The fact that the MM method
nonetheless allows for wrong solutions therefore proves that the set of sequential saddle
points and the set of their recursive counterparts do not always coincide under the
conditions imposed by MM. For our problem it turns out, that the latter is a strict
superset of the ﬁrst one. Hence, at least in this case the technique of MM yields only
necessary but not suﬃcient conditions for a solution.
In our discussion we will argue that the MM method might fail to yield a correct so-
lution whenever the problem under consideration is not strictly concave. This highlights
the importance of our results: Concavity (and hence all the more so strict concavity)
is a rather restrictive condition as many interesting economic problems which include
incentive constraints are very often nonconcave. In fact, most of the models analyzed in
the articles mentioned above study problems which fall into two main categories, Ram-
sey taxation and default with capital accumulation, which are known to have typically
a nonconcave structure.4 An exception to this point is Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2001),
who study risk sharing with default without capital accumulation. It seems that the
popularity of the MM approach derives mainly from the computational advantages it
provides in numerical analyses (see footnote 1). Our ﬁndings (the lack of suﬃciency of
the optimality conditions which the method yields) show though that its use for such
purposes is rather inappropriate.
An interesting interpretation of the limitations of the MM approach can be obtained
by comparing it with classical dynamic programming. This comparison reveals that
the MM co-states do not allow for a suﬃciently ’sharp’ description of the true state of
the optimization problem. In a sense which we will make more precise in this paper,
in our example to each of the MM co-states along the optimal path there corresponds
a whole interval of values of the primal state variable used in the Bellman approach.
Therefore, ﬁxing a co-state does not pin down the correct continuation path which,
as we will see, in eﬀect amounts to a relaxation of the true feasibility and optimality
conditions.
We proceed in the following way. In the next section we introduce our problem
and describe its true set of solutions. In Section 3 we go on to characterize the set of
solutions obtained by using the MM method. In Section 4 we discuss the results and
the reasons underlying the failure of the recursive saddle point technique. The last
4Ramsey taxation problems are known to be in general nonconcave since Lucas and Stokey (1983)
(see page 62). In the case of default with capital accumulation Cooley et al. (2001) themselves (in
footnote 10) point out that the problem is nonconcave since the endogeneity of default value creates
nonconvexities in the incentive feasibility set.
2section concludes.
2 The Problem





¯t (y ¡ at) (1a)






; 8t ¸ 0; (1c)
where y > ¯ a > b > 0 and 0 < ¯ < 1.5 Throughout the main part of the paper we will
furthermore assume that u(a) = a. Only in the appendix we will consider the case of
a non-linear constraint.
For the sake of concreteness we will interpret this problem as one where a sequence
of endowments (y;y;:::) has to be divided between two agents in such a way, that the
discounted value of the consumption stream of the ﬁrst one (1a) is maximized, subject
to a technological feasibility condition (1b) and the constraint that the discounted value
of the consumption stream of the second household never falls below b=(1 ¡ ¯) (1c).
Throughout the paper we will refer to the ﬁrst consumer also as planner or principal
and to the second one as agent.6
Given the linearity of the utility functions of both individuals and the simple form
of the technological feasibility constraint, the problem is rather trivial and no speciﬁc
techniques are required to characterize the set of its solutions. The set of optimizing
sequences, which we denote by A¤, is given by all sequences fatg which satisfy the
following conditions:













¯nan ¸ ¯t(at ¡ b) 8t ¸ 0: (2c)
5Notice that throughout we stick to the notation of MM in order to facilitate the comparison.
6In the terminology of optimal contracting one can interpret our problem also as one where a planner
maximizes his discounted returns subject to the constraint that the agent should have no incentive to
’default’(condition (1c)).
3The second condition simply requires that the agent receives a discounted utility
exactly equal to b=(1¡¯) in period zero. The third condition instead says that optimal
consumption plans of the agent have to be ’backloaded’: Transfers to the agent can
exceed b only by the accumulated (and appropriately discounted) amount by which the
payments in the periods up to t have fallen short of b.7 Notice that the value generated
by any sequence in A¤ is (y ¡ b)=(1 ¡ ¯):
Since the programm (1a)-(1c) is concave, each element of A¤ corresponds to a

















In particular one can easily verify that fatg belongs to A¤ if and only if ((1;0;0;:::);fatg)
is a solution of (3).
3 Characterizing the set of solutions using the MM ap-
proach
In this section we characterize the set of solutions to our problem with the help of the
method developed by MM.8 Essentially, their approach consists in transforming the
saddle point problem associated to the original sequential maximization problem into
















= ¹0 + °0
¹10
= ¹1 + °1 (4)
7Combining this last condition with (2b) yields again the no-default constraint (1c).
8Notice that our problem is indeed contained in the class of problems addressed by MM. Properties
A1 and A2 (see page 19 of MM) of MM are trivially satisﬁed, as our problem is deterministic and in
its original sequential form does not include a state variable. Also, since both the objective function as
well as the constraint are linear, they are not only continuous, but also quasiconcave. The boundedness
requirements in A3 and A4 are not an issue here since we can always deﬁne both the return of the
planner and the utility of the agent on [0;y]. Moreover, the space of the sequences fatg which satisfy
technical feasibility is a convex set as it is the Cartesian product of convex sets. Finally, any constant
transfer stream fa;a;:::g with b < a < ¯ a satisﬁes the interiority condition A5.
9For more details on how to derive this recursive saddle point functional equation from the sequential
saddle point problem see Section 2 of MM.
4As in MM we have introduced the constant R, which can be any number which bounds
the planner’s per period payoﬀ from below. Since in our case the principal’s consump-
tion can never be negative (¯ a < y), we can set R = 0.
Suppose W¤ solves problem (4) and Áa and Á° are the corresponding policy cor-
respondences. MM argue that any sequence of transfers generated with these policy
correspondences when starting with the initial condition ¹0
¡1 = 1 and ¹1
¡1 = 0 belongs
to A¤ and vice versa.





¹0 y ¡ b
1 ¡ ¯ + ¹1 b
1 ¡ ¯ if ¹0 ¸ ¹1
¹0y ¡ ¯ a
1 ¡ ¯ + ¹1 ¯ a
1 ¡ ¯ if ¹0 < ¹1
solves the functional equation (4).10 The corresponding policy correspondences Áa :
R2







¯ a if ¹0 < ¹1
[maxf0;(b ¡ ¯¯ a)=(1 ¡ ¯)g;¯ a] if ¹0 = ¹1




(0;0) if ¹0 < ¹1
(0;¹0 ¡ ¹1) if ¹0 ¸ ¹1.
Proof. We simply have to show that for the given value function W¤, the policies Áa
and Á° solve the saddle point problem in (4) and that plugging these solutions back
into the saddle point problem returns again W¤.






¹0 (y ¡ a) + °0 (y ¡ a) + ¹1a + °1(a ¡
b
1 ¡ ¯
) + ¯W¤(¹0 + °0;¹1 + °1) (5)
Observe, that (5) is strictly increasing in °0, regardless of the values of °1 and a and also
independently of whether ¹0 ¸ ¹1 or ¹0 < ¹1 (remember, that ¯ a < y by assumption).
Therefore, as claimed, the unique optimal value for °0 is zero.
Next, suppose ¹0 < ¹1. We have to show that in this case the unique solution of
the saddle point problem in (5) is given by °1 = 0 and a = ¯ a. In order to do so, notice
ﬁrst, that for all °1 ¸ 0 the objective function is strictly increasing in a. Therefore,
10Notice, that, consistently with the results of MM, the value function W
¤ is both continuous and
homogeneous of degree one (see Proposition 4 of MM).









¯ a ¡ b
1 ¡ ¯
:
Since ¯ a > b, it follows that the unique minimizing value for °1 is zero.
Finally, consider the case ¹0 ¸ ¹1. We ﬁrst argue, that the only candidate for the









1 ¡ ¯ if °1 · ¹0 ¡ ¹1
¯ a
1 ¡ ¯ if °1 ¸ ¹0 ¡ ¹1.
Hence, in order for a ﬁnite minimizer to exist (for °1), a must be chosen greater
than (b ¡ ¯¯ a)=(1 ¡ ¯). This, together with technological feasibility, requires that a 2
[maxf0;(b ¡ ¯¯ a)=(1 ¡ ¯)g;¯ a]. Values of °1 strictly larger than ¹0 ¡ ¹1 require a =
(b¡¯¯ a)=(1¡¯) (only for this value of a (5) is constant in °1). But for all °1 > ¹0¡¹1 (5)
is strictly increasing in a and hence a would have to be set equal to ¯ a; a contradiction.
On the other hand, for all values of °1 from the interval [0;¹0 ¡ ¹1) the objective
function is strictly decreasing in a, implying an optimal value of a equal to zero. For
a = 0 though, the Lagrange multiplier would have to be at least as large as ¹0 ¡ ¹1 as
the slope of (5) over this range is ¡b for a = 0. This again leads to a contradiction. It
follows therefore that °1 = ¹0 ¡ ¹1 is the unique candidate for the saddle.
If °1 equals ¹0 ¡ ¹1, a cancels from (5) and hence, all technically feasible values
would be maximizers. It remains to be determined for which subset of [0;¯ a] °1 = ¹0¡¹1
is a minimizer. We have already seen in the previous paragraph, that a must satisfy,
a ¸ (b ¡ ¯¯ a)=(1 ¡ ¯) as this guarantees that the objective function is non-decreasing
for °1 > ¹0¡¹1. This is the only relevant condition if ¹0¡¹1 = 0. Hence, in that case
any a in [maxf0;(b ¡ ¯¯ a)=(1 ¡ ¯)g;¯ a] is admissible. If instead, ¹0 ¡ ¹1 > 0 then we
also have to impose a condition that assures that (5) is non-increasing for °1 < ¹0¡¹1
(this is required in order to avoid that °1 = 0, which we know cannot be part of a
saddle point). As can be seen by inspection of the slopes of the objective function, this
condition will be satisﬁed whenever a · b.
This completes the part of the proof regarding Áa and Á°. It is a simple algebraic
exercise to show that plugging the corresponding values of the policies back into (5)
returns the correct expression for W¤.
Remember, that the initial values for ¹0 and ¹1 are 1 and 0, respectively. These
initial conditions together with the above stated policies imply that in the ﬁrst period
11The slopes in °
1 = ¹
0¡¹
1 given in the following expression should be interpreted as the righthand
and lefthand derivatives respectively.
6a has to be chosen from [maxf0;(b ¡ ¯¯ a)= (1 ¡ ¯)g;b], while °1 is to be set equal to
¹0¡¹1 = 1. From the second period on the state will remain constant, since according
to Á°, °1 must be zero whenever ¹0 = ¹1. Consequently, we also have a ﬁxed set of
admissible choices for the control a from the second period onwards, which is equal to
[maxf0;(b ¡ ¯¯ a)=(1 ¡ ¯)g;¯ a]:
Summarizing, the set of transfer sequences fatg, that satisfy the optimality condi-
tions of the MM approach, AMM, is characterized by
at 2 [0;¯ a] 8 t; (6a)
a0 2 [(b ¡ ¯¯ a)=(1 ¡ ¯);b] and (6b)
at 2 [(b ¡ ¯¯ a)=(1 ¡ ¯);¯ a] 8 t ¸ 1: (6c)
A ﬁrst inspection of these conditions immediately reveals that they do not specify
any intertemporal link between the controls. This is in clear contrast to the deﬁning
conditions of A¤. Both (2b), which requires the agent to get a utility of exactly b=(1¡¯)
and (2c), which restricts possible solutions to backloaded paths, deﬁne intertemporal
relations between the controls.
In order to highlight the consequences of this divergence between (2a)-(2c) and
(6a)-(6c), suppose that b < ¯¯ a. According to (6a)-(6c), in this case the sequence of
zero-transfers, at = 0 8 t, also belongs to AMM. But of course, such a sequence is
not (incentive) feasible in the sequential problem and hence does not belong to A¤, as
it implies a zero lifetime utility for the agent in each period, while by hypothesis he
should receive at least b=(1 ¡ ¯) (see (1c)). So we have to conclude that the recursive
saddle point approach allows for ’wrong’ solutions.
The zero sequence, is of course only one of many wrong solutions. In fact, with
the sequences contained in AMM one can generate any payoﬀ for the planner that lies
between y=(1 ¡ ¯) ¡ b ¡ ¯¯ a=(1 ¡ ¯) and y. Hence, some of the MM-solutions yield
the planner a lower payoﬀ than the truely optimal transfer schemes. While not being
optimal some of those sequences satisfy feasibility (take the sequence (b;¯ a;¯ a;:::)).
Notice ﬁnally, that all sequences that satisfy (2a)-(2c) also satisfy (6a)-(6c).12 In
other words, the conditions (6a)-(6c) derived with the help of the MM method are only
necessary but not suﬃcient conditions for the true set of solutions.
12Technical feasibility is obviously satisﬁed. Moreover, setting t = 0 in (2c) gives a0 · b as required
in (6b). From the same condition follows that one must have at ¸ maxf0;(b ¡ ¯¯ a)=(1 ¡ ¯)g for all
t ¸ 0: For any a smaller than (b ¡ ¯¯ a)=(1 ¡ ¯), not even continuing with the maximal transfers ¯ a in
all future periods would allow to satisfy the no-default condition (2c).
74 Discussion
4.1 Why suboptimal and/or unfeasible solutions?
Why is the MM-approach not able to isolate the truly optimal solutions? In order to
understand the reasons underlying this failure, let us consider the conditions (6a)-(6c),
that characterize AMM in some more detail. They tell us, that in every period we must
have a ¸ (b ¡ ¯¯ a)=(1 ¡ ¯), or equivalently a + ¯ ¯ a
1 ¡ ¯ ¸ b
1 ¡ ¯. The left hand side of
this last expression is nothing else but the agents utility, if he is given a today and ¯ a in
every period from tomorrow onwards. We can therefore interpret the whole condition
as the recursive form of the no-default condition in (1c): a is an admissible choice
today as long as there is at least one (technically) feasible future stream of transfers,
which together with a guarantees the agent a payoﬀ (from today onwards) no lower
than b=(1 ¡ ¯).
This condition per se makes perfectly sense. The problem is simply that the MM-
approach fails to ’enforce’ it. As we have already pointed out in the previous section,
there is nothing in the MM-optimality conditions which links the choices of the controls
across diﬀerent periods. Instead, the set of admissible choices is constant throughout
time,13 and so the method is not able to guarantee that a low transfer payment in
the current period will be followed by suﬃciently high payments in the future. The
zero-transfer example of the previous section demonstrates this most clearly. In each
period t, the payment at = 0 is ’acceptable’ since the overall payoﬀ equal to b=(1 ¡ ¯)
would be guaranteed, for example, by the continuation path (b=¯;b=¯;b=¯;::::).
As we have already remarked in the introduction, it is useful to compare the MM-
method with classical dynamic programming in order to understand its failure better.14
As in many economic applications the appropriate state variable which allows us
to set up the optimization problem (1a)-(1c) in the form of a Bellman equation is the
agent’s continuation utility from period t onward Ut =
P1
n=0 ¯tat+n. It satisﬁes the
following (implicit) law of motion:
Ut = at + ¯Ut+1: (7)
It is well known that the value of our optimization problem (1a)-(1c) is given by
13Only in the initial period the set of admissible choices is diﬀerent from [maxf0;(b¡¯¯ a)=(1¡¯);¯ ag].
14For a more detailed discussion of what follows see Stokey et. al. (1989).
8V (b=(1 ¡ ¯)), where the function V solves the following functional equation






i y ¡ a + ¯V (U0) (8)




U = a + ¯U0: (10)
One can easily verify that the set of solutions generated by this method coincides
with A¤.
Notice, that the law of motion of the state variable U enters as a constraint in
the Bellman equation. Hence, with every admissible value for the control a today, one
chooses also the unique discounted value of the sequence of controls to be followed in the
future, U0. Since U0 in turn will deﬁne the constraint for the next period, the consistency
of the choice throughout time is guaranteed, that is, if in the current period (a;U0) are
chosen, U0 is indeed the utility that the agent will receive in the future periods.
The distinguishing feature of the MM-approach as opposed to classical dynamic
programming is that it does not set up the problem in terms of the planners objec-
tive. Instead it transforms the original optimization program into a recursive welfare
maximization problem, where the welfare weights attached to the principal (¹0) and to
the agent (¹1) serve as state variables. Hence, in the MM method, the continuation
utility of the agent is not chosen directly but is controlled by ﬁxing corresponding wel-
fare weights. In this sense, the MM-states provide an ’indirect’ or ’dual’ description
(as opposed to the ’primal’ states used in dynamic programming) of the state of the
system.
This ’indirect’ approach works ﬁne as long as we can associate to each dual state
a unique primal state, but it generates wrong solutions as soon as a one-to-one rela-
tionship between the two types of states fails to exist. This is exactly what happens
in our example: Due to our linearity assumptions, the frontier of the set of technically
feasible continuation utilities is decreasing at the constant slope of ¡1. Therefore, any
point on this frontier corresponds to a solution of the welfare maximization problem if
the welfare weights of both agents are the same.
The consequences of this are very clear: If a single pair of welfare weights corre-
sponds to all possible divisions of the joint welfare of the two individuals from the
current period onwards, this simply means that the MM approach does not allow for a
suﬃciently ’sharp’ description of the state. Fixing a dual state does not imply a speciﬁc
promise about how to divide the pie in the future. Instead, all possible divisions which
correspond to the given pair of welfare weights might be followed.
9It is interesting to notice, that choosing a solution in AMM ¡ A¤ does not imply,
that we calculate a wrong value for the planner. Evaluating W¤ at the point (1;0)
gives (y ¡ b)=(1 ¡ ¯), which is indeed the value of the original optimization problem
as we have already seen in Section 2. The intuition for this is that in a recursive
welfare maximization problem, the value in period zero does not depend on how the
welfare is distributed between the two individuals from the second period onwards. All
what matters is that in every period the ¹-weighted sum of the two agents welfare
is maximized. For (¹0;¹1) = (1;1) this condition is satisﬁed by all points on the
linear utility possibility frontier and so shifting welfare between the two agents in any
non-initial period has no inﬂuence on the (period 0) value of W¤ at (1;0).
4.2 Recursive vs. sequential saddle points and the role of concavity
MM link the solutions obtained with their method only in an indirect way with the
true set of solutions of the underlying optimization problem. Their strategy can be
described as follows: After deﬁning a class of optimization problems they characterize
the relationship between the solution sets of those problems and the saddle points of the
corresponding Lagrangeans. Using standard arguments they show that the Lagrangean
method always yields suﬃcient conditions for a solution which are also necessary in case
the problem under consideration is concave.
In a second step they then go on to develop their main result. They show that
any sequential saddle point problem associated to an optimization problem from their
class, can be transformed into a recursive saddle point problem which under rather
weak conditions gives rise to the same set of solutions as the former. In fact, they argue
that whenever the underlying optimization problem is concave no further conditions
are required. For non-concave problems, recursively calculated saddle points solve the
corresponding sequential saddle point problem only if the sequence of the recursively
generated Lagrange multipliers satisﬁes a boundedness condition (while again for the
other direction no additional conditions are necessary).
Combining the two results, MM conclude that their method not only yields a full
characterization of the set of solutions of a concave optimization problem but that it
also gives suﬃcient conditions (though not necessary ones) for non-concave problems
(subject to the above mentioned boundedness condition).
We have already pointed out in Section 2, that for any solution of our concave
problem there is a corresponding saddle point of the associated Lagrangean and vice
versa. The fact that the MM method yields wrong solutions for our problem tells us
therefore, that concavity alone cannot be a suﬃcient condition for equivalence between
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Figure 1: The case of a non-concave utility possibility frontier
Given that concavity does not guarantee that the MM approach works correctly one
has to expect that the method fails also in the nonconcave case. In the appendix we
provide a worked out example which shows this formally. In order to get an intuition for
why in the nonconcave case the same problems arise as in our linear example consider
Figure 4.2. Suppose a nonconcave optimization problem gives rise (at some state) to a
(nonconvex) utility possibility set as depicted in this ﬁgure. Assume that the (unique)
true solution of the problem is to choose in each period ˆ UA as continuation utility for
the agent. As one can see from the ﬁgure, the relative welfare weight corresponding
to this point on the utility possibility frontier, ˆ ¹1=ˆ ¹0 supports also the choice of ˜ UA.
Hence, again there are multiple continuation utilities corresponding to one and the
same relative welfare weight. Not being able to discriminate between the two points
the the recursive saddle point method will admit for wrong solutions.
This discussion suggests that the MM method can work only if the sets of contin-
uation utilities of the optimization problem are strictly convex, for only in that case
any pair of welfare weights supports exactly one pair of continuation payoﬀs. Unfor-
tunately, strict convexity of the utility possibility frontiers can only be guaranteed by
imposing strict concavity assumptions on the problem under consideration. Obviously
such a requirement is very costly, in that it reduces substantially the class of economic
problems to which the approach might be applied. In fact MM themselves point out
that problems which include incentive constraints often have a nonconcave structure.
These observations are most relevant for the literature mentioned in the introduc-
tion. As we have already remarked there, in most of those articles (Attanasio and
11Rios-Rull, 2001, are an exception) the MM approach is applied to non-concave opti-
mization problems. Our results show though that the application of the method to
such problems is not very advisable.
It should be clear that the main argument of the present paper does not rely on
the speciﬁcity of the example we are analyzing. Nevertheless, we would like to mention
that the linear case is a very relevant one for two main reasons. First, economists very
often use randomized allocations in order to convexify the utility possibility set of non-
concave problems. Therefore a utility possibility frontier containing linear pieces is all
but a degenerate situation.15 In fact, the strategy to use randomized allocations has
already been applied in papers using the MM technique. For instance, we can mention
here the work of Ezra Friedman (1998). Second, in dynamic optimization problems the
time dimension provides an ’implicit’ instrument for the convexiﬁcation of the utility
possibility set. Hence, non concave problems may exhibit linear pieces in the utility
possibility frontier even without explicit randomizations.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have applied the recursive saddle point method developed by Marcet
and Marimon (1999) to a simple concave dynamic optimization problem. Our results
show that for problems which are not strictly concave, the conditions delivered by the
MM method are not suﬃcient for optimality. It is interesting to notice that in the case
of our example it turns out that the MM conditions are necessary.16
Given our ﬁndings it is natural to ask whether the reliability of solutions obtained by
the MM approach could be guaranteed by ex-post checks of optimality and feasibility.
Unfortunately, in general that seems to be hardly a viable procedure. In our example,
for instance, that would require to check an inﬁnite countable number of constraints.
Moreover, to the unique optimal value W¤(0;1) there corresponds a continuum of
possible returns for the principal.
15There is a long list of references here. One of the earlier papers which proposes the use of lotteries
in dynamic contracting is perhaps Phelan and Townsend (1991). Among the most recent contributions
that have been using appropriate randomizations to convexify the problem one can name Ligon, Thomas
and Worral (2000), Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2002), Clementi and
Hopenhayn (2002). Ligon et. al. (2000) and Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2002) are of particular
interest, as their models fall into the MM-class, although they use the primal method.
16We do not know though how general this result is. We guess that the MM conditions are in general
necessary for sequential saddle points. This would imply that they are also satisﬁed by every optimum
whenever the problem under consideration is concave. On the other hand we can not draw such a
conclusion for nonconcave problems since the conditions characterizing the set of sequential saddle
points are only suﬃcient for a solution.
12On the other hand, sometimes there might be speciﬁc situations where the feasibility
check can be done - at least in an approximate way - in a ﬁnite number of steps.
For example, consider the case where it is known that the optimal plan tends to a
stationary set which is easy to identify and lies in the interior of the feasibility set.17
Assume furthermore that the outcome of the MM procedure converges to the mentioned
feasible stationary set. In this situation, one might expect that after a possibly large
but ﬁnite number of periods feasibility is guaranteed, since the system is suﬃciently
‘close’ to the feasible stationary set. As a consequence, one could restrict the check of
feasibility to the initial periods of the transition.
Unfortunately, ﬁnding a general approach for the ex-post check of optimality seems
even harder than the check for feasibility. The main reason of concern is that - as
our example emphasizes - the MM procedure might lead to a continuum of possible
candidates for the optimum.
17This seems to be the case of the ‘unrestricted’ steady state in the imperfect enforceability model
of Marcet and Marimon (1992).
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157 Appendix
In this appendix we show that the problem which arises in our linear example might
be present also in the nonconcave case. In particular, we will consider again problem
(1a)-(1c) and assume that u(a) = a2, ¯ a = 1 and b = ¯n, where n is some natural
number.
Before we proceed to solve this problem with the MM method, we would like to
point out, that its unique ’true’ solution is given by a stream of transfers which are
equal to zero for the ﬁrst 2n periods and equal to one afterwards. It is also important
to notice that this optimal stream together with the sequence of Lagrange multipliers
(1;0;0;:::) constitutes a saddle point of the problem’s associated Lagrangean (hence
the failure of the MM method does not derive from non-existence of a sequential saddle
point).
The recursive saddle point functional equation corresponding to the modiﬁed prob-















= ¹0 + °0
¹10
= ¹1 + °1 (11)






1 ¡ ¯ + ¹1 b2
1 ¡ ¯ if ¹0 ¸ ¹1
¹0 y ¡ 1
1 ¡ ¯ + ¹1 1
1 ¡ ¯ if ¹0 < ¹1
:





1 if ¹0 < ¹1
f0;1g if ¹0 = ¹1




(0;0) if ¹0 < ¹1
(0;¹0 ¡ ¹1) if ¹0 ¸ ¹1.
Before we continue with the proof, notice that when starting with the initial values
¹0 = 1 and ¹1 = 0 the set of solutions generated with the above policy correspondences
is simply the set of all sequences composed of zeros and ones which start with 0.
In particular, this set contains also the zero sequence which of course fails to satisfy
feasibility for any 1 > b > 0. Hence, just as in the linear case the MM method allows
for non-feasible transfer streams as solutions.
16The following proof essentially follows the same steps as the proof for the linear
case contained in the text. That is, we will simply show that the above policy corre-
spondences solve the saddle point problem given W¤. Showing that W¤ indeed then
solves the functional equation is a simple algebraic exercise and is therefore omitted.





¹0 (y ¡ a) + °0 (y ¡ a) + ¹1a2 + °1(a2 ¡
b2
1 ¡ ¯
) + ¯W¤(¹0 + °0;¹1 + °1):(12)
One can immediately see that the above expression is strictly increasing in °0, inde-
pendently of a and the welfare weights ¹0 and ¹1. Hence, °0 must be equal to zero.
Next consider the choice of a. The only terms of (12) which depend on a are
¡¹0a + (¹1 + °1)a2:
This expression is convex in a. Hence, the only two candidates for a maximizer are
the extreme points of the set of technically feasible transfers (i.e. a = 0 and a = 1).
Which of the two candidates is optimal depends on whether ¹0 is larger or smaller than
¹1 + °1. While in the former case we get a = 0 the latter case implies a = 1 and of
course both candidates are optimal if ¹0 = ¹1 + °1.
Suppose now that ¹0 < ¹1. As °1 can never be negative we know that in this
case we must always have a = 1 (since the condition ¹0 < ¹1 + °1 is always satisﬁed).











which implies that the unique minimizing value for °1 is zero.
Next, consider the case ¹0 > ¹1. We have to show that there is only one saddle
point, namely a = 0 and °1 = ¹0¡¹1. In order to do so we will ﬁrst prove that ¹0¡¹1
is the unique minimizer of the objective in °1 for a = 0. Since we have already seen
that a = 0 maximiezes (12) for °1 = ¹0 ¡ ¹1 it then only remains to show that there
is no saddle point with a = 1.










if °1 · ¹0 ¡ ¹1
1
1 ¡ ¯
if °1 ¸ ¹0 ¡ ¹1.
(13)







= ¡b2 < 0
18Again, the slopes at the point °
1 = ¹
0¡¹
1 are to interpreted as lefthand and righthand derivatives
respectively.











if °1 ¸ ¹0 ¡ ¹1. Hence, if a = 0 (12) is indeed decreasing in °1 up to ¹0 ¡ ¹1 and
increasing afterwards (remember that b = ¯n).







= 1 ¡ b2











(for °1 ¸ ¹0 ¡ ¹1). Both expressions are positive (since b < 1) and hence °1 would
have to be chosen equal to zero. We have already seen though that °1 < ¹0 ¡ ¹1 is
only compatible with a = 0.
Finally, consider the case ¹0 = ¹1. It is easily veriﬁed that ¹0 ¡ ¹1 = 0 is still the
unique minimizer of (12) if a = 0 (and so a = 0, °1 = ¹0 ¡ ¹1 = 0 is a saddle ). But
since in this situation °1 can never be chosen smaller then ¹0 ¡ ¹1 (14) implies that
also a = 1 and °1 = 0 is a saddle point, which concludes the prove.
18